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A special type of association, called a “unitization,” is formed when pieces of information
are encoded as a single representation in memory (e.g., “shirt” and “blue” are encoded as
a “blue shirt”; Graf and Schacter, 1989) and typically are later reactivated in memory as a
single unit, allowing access to the features of multiple related stimuli at once (Bader et al.,
2010; Diana et al., 2011). This review examines the neural processes supporting memory
for unitizations and how the emotional content of the material may influence unitization.
Although associative binding is typically reliant on hippocampal processes and supported
by recollection, the first part of this review will present evidence to suggest that when
two items are unitized into a single representation, memory for those bound items may
be accomplished on the basis of familiarity and without reliance on the hippocampus. The
second part of this review discusses how emotion may affect the processes that give rise
to unitizations. Emotional information typically receives a mnemonic benefit over neutral
information, but the literature is mixed on whether the presence of emotional information
impedes or enhances the associative binding of neutral information (reviewed by Mather,
2007). It has been suggested that the way the emotional and neutral details are related
together may be critical to whether the neutral details are enhanced or impeded (Mather,
2007; Mather and Sutherland, 2011).We focus on whether emotional arousal aids or inhibits
the creation of a unitized representation, presenting preliminary data, and future directions
to test empirically the effects of forming and retrieving emotional and neutral unitizations.
Keywords: emotion, associative memory, unitization, integration, medial temporal lobes
A key feature of human memory is the ability not only to remember
discrete pieces of information but also to form novel associations
between those pieces of information. Whether we are trying to
identify the acquaintances who work at the same company or the
specific combination of physical characteristics that indicate that a
particular plant is poisonous, we frequently draw on memory for
associations. A special type of association, called a “unitization,”
can be formed when the pieces are encoded as a single represen-
tation in memory (e.g., the item “shirt” and the color “blue” are
encoded as a “blue shirt”; Wollen et al., 1972; Graf and Schacter,
1989; Yonelinas, 2002; Diana et al., 2008, 2011). As Graf and Schac-
ter (1989) describe, unitization can happen in one of two ways:
either the items are perceived as having some underlying percep-
tual structure that leads them to be perceived as a single unit, or
their co-occurrence implies a relationship that leads them to be
combined together due to their presentation in space and time.
Unitizations can be beneficial because they are typically reacti-
vated in memory as a single unit, allowing access to the features of
multiple related stimuli at once.
THE CREATION AND RETRIEVAL OF UNITIZATIONS
In this first section, we will review some of the neuroanatomy rele-
vant to the formation and retrieval of unitized representations. We
will also describe patient and neuroimaging data that can elucidate
how unitizations are mnemonically encoded, and later accessed,
in memory.
ANATOMICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE MEDIAL TEMPORAL LOBES, AND
ITS RELATION TO UNITIZATION
Hippocampus and surrounding cortices
The medial temporal lobes have been described as having a
functionally hierarchical structure (Lavenex and Amaral, 2000;
Montaldi and Mayes, 2010), consisting of the parahippocampal
cortex (PHC), perirhinal (PrC), and entorhinal (EC) cortices,
and the hippocampus proper. It is still debated whether these
regions comprise a single system which enables declarative mem-
ory (e.g., Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991; Squire et al., 2007) or
contribute differentially to the encoding and retrieval of individ-
ual items and the relationships between those items (e.g., Cohen
and Eichenbaum, 1993; Aggleton and Brown, 1999; Diana et al.,
2007; Staresina and Davachi, 2008). Although coverage of this
debate is outside the purview of this review, understanding of the
proposed hierarchy is critical to discerning how unitized represen-
tations may be encoded and subsequently retrieved (Staresina and
Davachi, 2006, 2008).
Briefly, the PrC and PHC have reciprocal connections with both
unimodal (e.g., auditory and visual association areas) and multi-
modal association areas (e.g., posterior and anterior association
areas; Lavenex and Amaral, 2000). PrC and PHC are believed to
be the first site of integration of information from all sensory
cortices, and data have suggested that there is functional special-
ization even at this first stage, with PrC primarily receiving object
information from visual cortex and TE/TEO and PHC primarily
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receiving spatial information from the frontal and parietal cortices
(Diana et al., 2007; Suzuki, 2010; also Bachevalier and Nemanic,
2008 for similar evidence from Rhesus macaques). As such, we
can conceive of two possibilities for how the MTL may deal with
unitized representations based on this differentiation. On the one
hand, a to-be-unitized pair may be processed as a unitized object
in regions within the dorsal or ventral visual processing stream
(related to concepts of “object files” as originally conceived by
Kahneman et al., 1992, and to the dual-system model of visual
short-term memory proposed by Xu and Chun, 2006). This “pre-
packaged” information could then be communicated to the PrC
or PHC. On the other hand, the PrC may receive information
about the separate to-be-unitized objects or object features and
then begin the process of packaging them together – perceptu-
ally or mnemonically – into a single representation (e.g., Bussey
et al., 2003; Bussey and Saksida, 2007; Kent and Brown, 2012)
before passing on that information to the next regions in the hier-
archy (see Cowell et al., 2010; Graham et al., 2010; Saksida and
Bussey, 2010 for discussion of the role of the PRC in perception
and memory for complex feature conjunctions).
Entorhinal cortex shares reciprocal connections with PrC and
PHC, and it also receives direct inputs from multimodal associa-
tion cortices. EC therefore receives input from all sensory modal-
ities and is believed to play a greater role in the processing and
integration of contextual information than of object information
(Suzuki et al., 1997). EC does, however, receive object information
from PrC and passes that information along to the hippocampus;
most generally, the EC is considered to mediate much of the infor-
mational input to the hippocampus (Canto et al., 2008). Relative to
other regions of MTL, less is known about the exact function of EC,
but we can offer several possibilities. First, it is possible that because
EC serves in this “gatekeeper” role of passing the hippocampus
information from other brain regions (Hargreaves et al., 2005) –
including PrC – that EC plays no direct role in the formation of
unitizations. Instead, it may either pass pre-bound unitizations,
formed in either the PrC or earlier regions of the ventral visual
stream, to the hippocampus (if unitization happens before infor-
mation reaches the hippocampus), or EC may pass information
about individual objects or stimuli to the hippocampus, and uni-
tization may take place within the hippocampus proper. Another
alternative is that the EC itself is responsible for at least some
processes relevant to forming unitizations, given its suggested role
in contextual integration (Suzuki et al., 1997) and in subsequent
correct recognition of verbal pairs (Jackson and Schacter, 2004).
At present, these possibilities have not been distinguished, and so
future research will be needed to explore the EC’s role in memory
for unitizations.
The hippocampus sits atop the anatomical hierarchy and
receives well-integrated information from EC, PrC, and PHC
(Mayes et al., 2007). The hippocampus projects this richly com-
plex, integrated information back to cortical association areas, and
this process – the feedback loop of information from cortical asso-
ciation areas, through MTL, and back to the cortex – is believed by
some to be what produces the phenomenology of episodic mem-
ory (Squire, 1992). As we have alluded to, although it is clear that
the hippocampus is essential for the formation of typical associ-
ations among stimuli (Aggleton and Brown, 1999; Eichenbaum
et al., 2007), it is less clear whether the hippocampus is needed
for the formation and retrieval of unitizations (Giovanello et al.,
2006; Quamme et al., 2007). We will return to this debate in the
next section of this review.
It is important to note that the interactions between these
MTL regions may be complicated by the fact that these regions
can have functional influences on one another without having
direct anatomical connections (see also Damoiseaux and Gre-
icius, 2009 for discussion). Lacy and Stark (2012) revealed that
functional connectivity – the strength of correlation in activity
among brain regions – was stronger among cortical regions of the
MTL (PrC, EC, and PHC) than it was between these regions and
the hippocampus. Conversely, hippocampal subfields had strong
inter-field functional connectivity but little connectivity with the
surrounding cortex. As such, it may not be sufficient to explore
what each of these MTL regions contributes to unitized mem-
ory in isolation; rather, understanding the functional connections
between these regions will likely be critical to understanding the
genesis of unitized representations in the brain.
Amygdala
In reviewing how emotion may interact with the unitization
process, we must also consider the role of the amygdala. The
amygdala’s role in the modulation of emotional memories – via
its interaction with other MTL regions – has been well estab-
lished (Gallagher and Chiba, 1996; Cahill and McGaugh, 1998;
Kensinger and Schacter, 2006), and although its role has been
investigated more thoroughly for memories that are fearful or
aversive, it also plays a role in memories of pleasurable experiences
(reviewed by LaBar, 2007). Animal research has demonstrated that
the amygdala – particularly the lateral and basal nuclei – shares
strong reciprocal connections with PrC, EC, and hippocampus,
specifically in the subiculum and in subfield CA1 (Krettek and
Price, 1977; Canteras and Swanson, 1992; Savander et al., 1997;
Shi and Cassell, 1999; Pitkänen et al., 2000). Thus, there is sub-
stantial anatomical evidence indicating a reciprocal relationship
between the amygdala and the anterior hippocampus as well as
PrC. In addition, there is physiological and functional evidence
of such a relationship. In rats, high frequency stimulation of
the anterior hippocampus has been shown to produce long-term
potentiation in the amygdala (Maren and Fanselow, 1985), and in
patients, the amount of amygdala damage relates to the amount
of hippocampal activity during an emotional memory task, and
vice versa (Richardson et al., 2004). The amygdala also has robust
connections to the visual cortex and regions along the ventral
visual processing stream (Freese and Amaral, 2005; Duncan and
Barrett, 2007). As such, there is an anatomical basis for predicting
an interaction between the amygdala, PrC, and visual pathway, one
that could influence the unitization process.
It has become clear that the amygdala does not act to enhance
all aspects of a memory. Instead, the amygdala has selective effects
on memory, enhancing some elements of a memory while having
no beneficial impact – and sometimes even having an impairing
effect – on other elements (reviewed by Kensinger, 2009; Mather
and Sutherland, 2011). While not specifically discussing unitiza-
tion, Mather (2007) described an “object-based framework” that
is highly relevant to the process of unitization: when contextual
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details (such as color, temporal order, etc.) are viewed as being
integral or intrinsic to the emotional stimulus, emotional arousal
(likely via activation of the amygdala; see Kensinger et al., 2011
for evidence) enhances the binding of those details. This finding
suggests that amygdala engagement can enhance the process of
unitization.
Having reviewed the anatomical hierarchy within the medial
temporal lobes, we now move to examine the empirical evidence
for how these structures help produce episodic memory for items,
their associations, and unitized representations. We begin with a
brief discussion of a common way that memory for items and
their associations is tested in the laboratory: through assessments
of recognition memory. We focus on a model that argues that
recognition memory can be supported by dissociable processes –
recollection (including memory for episodic details) and famil-
iarity (roughly akin to item familiarity; Atkinson and Juola, 1974;
Yonelinas, 2002) – that have in turn been argued to map on specif-
ically to the hippocampus and PrC, respectively (Aggleton and
Brown, 1999; Diana et al., 2007; Bowles et al., 2010). Understand-
ing how these regions and processes interact to produce an episodic
memory is critical to understanding how the brain may encode,
store, and retrieve unitized representations and how emotion may
impact those processes.
MEMORY THROUGH RECOGNITION
Often in the laboratory, memory for the relationship between
two items is tested through recognition. In a typical paradigm,
participants will study lists of unrelated paired associates (e.g.,
two semantically unrelated words, face-name pairs, etc.), and then
memory for pairs or for individual items can be tested as part of an
“old/new” recognition test. Although there are still some disagree-
ments even among those who propose a dual-process model of
recognition comprising recollection and familiarity (e.g., Yoneli-
nas, 1994, 2002; Wixted, 2007), what is generally agreed upon is
that recollection typically refers to the recall of specific episodic
detail that was associated with the test stimulus: for example, a
participant sees a recognition cue and retrieves specific knowledge
unique to the context in which that cue was initially encountered,
such as what information it appeared in conjunction with, what
information temporally preceded or followed it, what thought was
triggered by the information’s presentation, and so on (Montaldi
and Mayes, 2010). Familiarity, on the other hand, is assumed to
require no such access to episodic details. It is characterized by
the knowledge that a particular test stimulus has been encoun-
tered previously – sometimes referred to as a “feeling of knowing”
(Montaldi and Mayes, 2010) – but is not accompanied by retrieval
of other contextual or otherwise associated details. Although there
are alternative accounts to this “dual-process” model of memory
(e.g., Squire et al., 2007), our goal in this review is not to adju-
dicate between the models. Rather, our review will follow from a
wealth of research broadly demonstrating behavioral and neural
dissociations between these processes.
UNITIZATION IN THE BRAIN
A plethora of studies have supported a dual-process view not only
of recognition memory but also of the MTL system (see Eichen-
baum et al., 1994; Brown and Aggleton, 2001 for initial proposals).
This research has revealed that the hippocampus is involved in
associative binding of an item to its episodic context while the PrC
plays a more dominant role in the representation of single items
(see Diana et al., 2007; Eichenbaum et al., 2007 for reviews). An
important caveat, however, and the one that we describe next, is
that this hippocampal binding, and associated recollection, may
not be necessary in cases of unitization.
Patient and imaging data support the notion that unitized
representations can be supported by PrC and recognized via
familiarity. To examine whether familiarity could contribute to
the recognition of unitized representations, Diana et al. (2011)
asked participants to view items presented on either a red or
green background, and they were instructed either to imagine
the item in the color of the background (the high-unitization
condition), or to remember independently what color of back-
ground the item was paired with (low-unitization). Behaviorally,
familiarity-based judgments were significantly higher in the high-
vs. low-unitization condition, while recollection-based judgments
did not differ. ERP data showed that the ERP correlates of familiar-
ity – the early, fronto-central positivity – were significantly more
apparent in the high- vs. low-unitization condition, while unitiza-
tion demands had no effect on the ERP correlates for recollection.
As noted by Diana and colleagues, their data – taken together with
data from other studies that also revealed enhanced ERP corre-
lates of familiarity on tasks encouraging unitization (e.g., Ecker
et al., 2007; Diana et al., 2008; Bader et al., 2010) – provide rel-
atively strong support for the proposal that unitization enhances
familiarity-based recognition.
Although unitization may enhance the ability to recognize
item associations on the basis of familiarity, Pilgrim et al. (2012)
revealed that this may come at a cost when recognizing the individ-
ual items within the pair. They asked participants to study lists of
single items, as well as pairs of words studied using either a unitiza-
tion strategy (i.e., using mental imagery of the two items interact-
ing in some way) or a non-unitization strategy (i.e., imagining the
two items separately). Participants were then given a recognition
test of single items from both the item-only and unitization/non-
unitization conditions. At retrieval, the authors observed a reduced
frontal effect, typically associated with familiarity-based retrieval,
during recognition of items studied in the unitization condi-
tion relative to the item-only or non-unitization conditions. The
authors interpret this result as suggesting that unitization lim-
its familiarity-based access to items that have been combined
into a unitized representation. Importantly, unitization did not
affect overall item recognition accuracy: there was no difference
in d ′, hit rate, or reaction time for items in those two conditions.
Thus, unitization affected how the information was recognized
(by familiarity or recollection) and not whether it was recognized.
Although the authors describe this reduced familiarity signal as a
potential “cost” of unitization, they note that it could alternatively
be interpreted as a benefit of unitization: equivalent item recog-
nition memory, in an equivalent amount of time, is produced
without reliance on a familiarity signal. Regardless of the exact
interpretation of these findings, the results of this study, along with
those of Diana et al. (2008), suggest that the process of unitiza-
tion may differentially affect the role of familiarity in recognizing
the associations compared to the individual items, enhancing the
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influence of familiarity on the former while reducing its influence
on the latter.
Further evidence to suggest that unitization creates an asso-
ciative representation that can be retrieved by processes typically
associated with item memory or familiarity has come from two
sets of data sampling patients with MTL amnesia. Giovanello et al.
(2006) first showed, in a group of non-amnestic individuals, that
recognition of unitized associations relies more on familiarity than
recognition of non-unitized associations. They then discovered
that patients with amnesia were better at differentiating between
studied and rearranged pairs if the pairs formed compound words
(e.g., correctly responding “old” to the studied words “blackmail”
and “jailbird,” but “new” to the rearranged word “blackbird”) than
if the pairs formed novel associations (e.g., “surgeon-arrow”). For
non-amnestic controls, there was no such difference between the
two types of associations. These data are consistent with the pro-
posal that unitized representations can be remembered on the basis
of item memory or familiarity, processes more likely to be spared in
amnesia than those related to associative binding or recollection.
Quamme et al. (2007) presented similar findings: the
researchers tested five amnesic patients, two of whom had under-
gone a left unilateral temporal lobectomy, damaging the hip-
pocampus as well as PrC and EC, and three of whom were believed
to have lesions restricted to the hippocampus as a result of cerebral
hypoxia following cardiac arrest. When given pairs of unrelated
nouns to study, hypoxic patients with intact rhinal cortices later
recognized the pairs more readily if the words had been combined
into a compound word with a novel definition (e.g., “cloud-lawn”
would be defined as, “A yard used for sky-gazing.”) than if the
words were presented in a sentence (e.g., “The ___ could be seen
from the ___”). The two patients with temporal lobectomies,
exhibiting damage to the rhinal cortices, did not show any such
benefit from unitization.
These data offer compelling evidence that the hippocampus
is not necessary for the encoding and retrieval of unitized repre-
sentations, and they further suggest a role for the rhinal cortices
in the formation of unitizations. Further evidence for a role of
the PrC in unitization has come from studies using functional
MRI. Using a paradigm similar to that of Quamme et al. (2007),
Haskins et al. (2008) directly tested the hypothesis that PrC can
support the encoding of unitized representations. Healthy par-
ticipants were given pairs of semantically unrelated nouns (e.g.,
“steam tree”) and were asked to rate how well the words fit into a
given sentence frame (no unitization), or they were given a novel
definition for the compound of the two words and asked to rate
how well they thought the definition fit the compound (uniti-
zation). They were then shown test pairs that were either intact
from study or rearranged and had to indicate whether the words
had been studied together or not. The imaging data, along with
behavioral data from participants’ ROCs, indicated that left PrC
was more active during compound than sentence trials, and that
its activity at encoding was predictive of correct familiarity-based
recognition judgments at test.
Staresina and Davachi (2006) also offer functional MRI evi-
dence that the PrC can support the encoding of unitized item-color
information. In their task, participants viewed the verbal label
of an item (e.g., “elephant”) on a colored background, and were
asked to imagine the item in the color of the background (e.g.,
for a red background, imagine a red elephant) and decide if the
representation could plausibly appear in the real world or not.
Participants were then given a surprise test in which they had to
indicate if items were old or new, and if they judged an item to be
old, they had to indicate with what color the item had been pre-
sented. While they observed that bilateral hippocampal activity
at encoding predicted subsequent associative recognition success,
encoding activity in left PrC was also found to be predictive of
success at retrieving both the words and also the word-color pairs.
They suggested that the PrC was able to support associative recog-
nition for the item and its corresponding color because the color
and item information had been unitized at encoding.
To directly test their hypothesis, in a second study, Staresina and
Davachi (2008) used a similar encoding task, but they also asked
the participants to make one of two semantic decisions about
the item (judging its pleasantness or its plausibility). This manip-
ulation allowed the researchers to assess how MTL subregions
contribute to memory for those different types of detail. Consis-
tent with their previous results, they found that encoding activity
in the left hippocampus and bilateral PrC predicted subsequent
associative recognition for item-color pairings. In contrast, only
the hippocampus and not PrC predicted successful retrieval of the
item-context (i.e., encoding task) association. If we consider the
color to be associated via a process of unitization but the encoding
task to be associated through other means, then these data offered
further evidence that PrC may indeed help to encode unitized
associations but not other forms of associative learning.
While these three functional MRI studies indicate that PrC
offers an important contribution to the formation of associative
memory through unitization, they still cannot elucidate the spe-
cific role that PrC might play in the unitization process. That is, it
still remains unclear from these data whether PrC is responsible for
assembling unitizations – actually concatenating together the dif-
ferent object features into a single unit – or if it may receive already-
unitized representations from other regions and PrC encodes that
pre-assembled representation. To test this, Staresina and Davachi
(2010) conducted a third study systematically varying the uniti-
zation demands at encoding to investigate how PrC would track
with increasing unitization requirement. The hypothesis was that
if PrC activity showed a variable relation based on the varying
unitization demand, it would suggest that the PrC plays a role in
actually putting together novel unitizations. In their study, par-
ticipants viewed objects that were intact, fragmented into two
parts, or fragmented into four parts, and participants were asked
to imagine the whole item in the color of the background and
to determine its real-world plausibility. By including three frag-
mentation conditions, the researchers were able to vary how much
the item needed to be unitized to succeed at the encoding task.
Participants were given the same recognition task from Staresina
and Davachi (2006), described above. As in Staresina and Davachi
(2006), PrC activation at encoding – this time, bilaterally – was
predictive of subsequent item and associative recognition success;
however, PrC activation was unaffected by level of fragmentation.
Rather, regions throughout the ventral visual stream tracked with
increasing unitization demand. These data suggest that while PrC
can support the mnemonic encoding of unitized associations, the
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perceptual integration of a unitized representation may occur in
earlier stages of processing.
The role of the PrC in unitization likely does not stop after
encoding. Diana et al. (2010) asked participants to study nouns
presented on a red or green background and to process the color
either as an item feature – by imagining the item in that color – or as
a contextual detail by imaging the item interacting with a stop sign
(red) or dollar bill (green). Although control participants were able
to retrieve the color information with equal probability, regardless
of the encoding instructions, amnesic patients were more likely
to retrieve the color information if it had been processed as an
item feature rather than a contextual detail. fMRI results with
healthy individuals revealed that PrC activity was associated with
the retrieval of the color information if it had been studied as an
item feature while PHC and hippocampal activity was associated
with the retrieval of the color information if it had been studied
as a contextual feature.
It is worth noting that domain in which information is pre-
sented and manipulated (e.g., whether the participant is creating
a compound word or imagining the visual representation of an
item) likely affects the neural processes that underlie successful
unitization. Although to our knowledge, no study has directly
contrasted the neural processes leading to integration by visual
or verbal means, it seems plausible that tasks that require uniti-
zation of visual entities – such as those just described – would
engage visual processing regions while tasks that achieve unitiza-
tion through the creation of a new concept may engage semantic
processing regions such as anterior temporal lobe (Lambon et al.,
2010). Regardless of the domain in which the unitization occurs,
however, one critical point remains true: it does not appear to be
the case that hippocampal engagement is necessary for unitization
to be successful.
The data reviewed in this section suggests three main con-
clusions: (1) Unitized associations can be remembered on the
basis of familiarity and using processes typically associated with
single item memory, but this effect of unitization may come at
the cost of familiarity-based recognition of the individual com-
ponents of the associated pair. (2) At an anatomical level, the
data suggest that the hippocampus is not necessary for forming
and encoding unitizations. Instead, PrC may play a role in the
mnemonic encoding and retrieval of those unitizations, although
(3) at encoding, PrC may, instead or in addition, receive already-
unitized information from other brain regions and then work to
store that unitized representation into long-term memory. In the
section below, we outline the predictions that each of these find-
ings makes with regard to the effect of emotion on memory for
unitized representations.
EMOTION AND UNITIZATION
It has been well established that emotional information is han-
dled differently in memory from non-emotional information,with
emotional information typically receiving a mnemonic benefit
(reviewed by Hamann, 2001; Kensinger, 2009). The emotional-
ity of an experience is often characterized along two orthogonal
dimensions: arousal (how exciting or calming an experience is)
and valence (how pleasant or unpleasant; Russell, 1980). Because
the bulk of research examining the effect of emotion on memory
has focused on the dimension of arousal (Cahill et al., 1994; Cahill
and McGaugh, 1995), and because arousal is thought to be the
main factor that influences amygdala activity (Adolphs et al., 2001;
Sharot and Phelps, 2004; Berntson et al., 2007), we will focus our
review on the contributions of emotional arousal to emotional
memory. It is important to note, however, that valence can influ-
ence associative memory as well (Pierce and Kensinger, 2011) and
may interact with arousal to influence both the subjective qualities
of a memory (Talarico and Rubin, 2003; Sharot and Phelps, 2004;
Zimmerman and Kelley, 2010) and also the way that the amyg-
dala interacts with visual and prefrontal processes (e.g., enhanced
connectivity between amygdala and middle occipital gyrus and
amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus during encoding of high-
arousal negative items and low-arousal positive items; Mickley
Steinmetz et al., 2010).
To date, there has been little research that specifically has exam-
ined the effect of arousal on unitization. There have, however, been
many studies that have more generally assessed the effect of arousal
on recollection and familiarity, and on the associative binding of
item features and contextual details. In the sections below, we
review the research on the effects of arousal on memory that we
believe can lead to informed predictions regarding the effects of
arousal on unitization.
THE EFFECTS OF AROUSAL ON ASSOCIATIVE BINDING: IMPLICATIONS
FOR UNITIZATION
Although the effects of arousal on associative binding initially
seemed inconsistent – with arousal sometimes enhancing the bind-
ing of details (e.g., MacKay et al., 2004) and at other times having
no effect, or impairing, such binding (e.g., Kensinger and Schacter,
2006; Bergmann et al., 2012; note that the latter examines interac-
tions between both valence and arousal) – more recent accounts
have proposed a unified framework for understanding the complex
pattern. Mather (2007) proposed an “object-based” framework,
with arousal enhancing the binding of information encoded as an
item feature but not of information encoded as a contextual detail
(see also Kensinger, 2007, 2009). This framework can account for
much of the extant data, but there are some exceptions, when
arousal does not enhance memory for intra-item features (Guillet
and Arndt, 2009) and when it does enhance memory for inter-item
binding (Pierce and Kensinger, 2011).
Recognizing the need to account for these contradictory pat-
terns, Mather and Sutherland (2011) proposed the“Arousal-Biased
Competition” (ABC) model, describing how arousal may bias
resources toward the most conspicuous or goal-relevant stimuli.
Thus, if a single item (e.g., a snake) gains priority, then arousal
will enhance the binding of the features of that item (e.g., its color,
form). But if the pairing of items takes on importance (e.g., the
snake and its owner) then arousal will enhance the binding of that
association. In other words, it is not the type of detail (item vs.
contextual or intra- vs. inter-item associations) that predicts the
effect of arousal but the goal relevance of the detail (see related dis-
cussion by Levine and Edelstein, 2009). Although it is always the
case that goal-relevant information will be prioritized, according
to ABC, arousal exaggerates this prioritization; thus, arousal will
enhance the binding of goal-relevant features and will impair the
binding of features that are not goal relevant.
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In this context, the effect of arousal on associative binding will
depend critically on the way the to-be-bound pieces of informa-
tion are initially processed or perceived. On the one hand, because
unitization requires that pieces of information be processed as a
coherent whole, all features that are being bound into a unitized
representation may be goal relevant. If true, then arousal may lead
to a beneficial effect on the process of unitization. On the other
hand, because arousing features can capture attention and become
prioritized for processing, the presence of those arousing features
may make it harder to attend to the other features present at the
same time, thereby making the creation of a unitization harder to
achieve. Each of these possibilities will be expanded upon in the
next sections.
WHY AROUSAL MAY ENHANCE UNITIZATION
As described earlier, neuroimaging data (e.g., Staresina and
Davachi, 2010) suggest that visual regions such as those within
the ventral visual pathway can be responsible for the initial for-
mation of unitized representations. Thus, unitizations may be
created before the information reaches the MTL system. Sepa-
rate literatures have revealed that activity in these visual regions
can be modulated by the arousing content of information. Neu-
roimaging studies have shown that participants tend to exhibit
greater activity in visual cortex and ventral visual stream when
viewing emotional vs. non-emotional images (Vuilleumier et al.,
2001, 2004; Compton, 2003; Mather et al., 2006), likely because of
modulation of visual processing by the amygdala. These data sug-
gest that processing of emotional items within the visual cortex
may be prioritized, leading these items to be attended to before
neutral items (Öhman and Mineka, 2001; Öhman et al., 2001),
to hold attention longer (LaBar et al., 2000; Nummenmaa et al.,
2006; Knight et al., 2007), and to be associated with greater encod-
ing activity in visual regions than non-emotional items (Bradley
et al., 2003; Mather et al., 2006).
Putting these literatures together: if visual regions such as those
along the ventral visual pathway are responsible for the initial
formation of unitized representations, the presence of arousal
could facilitate activation within those regions, enabling the rapid
creation of a unitization. In addition, these literatures may sug-
gest that unitizations containing an arousing component would
require less cognitive effort to create than unitizations that contain
only neutral information. Because arousing information benefits
from prioritized processing, it may be more rapidly and easily inte-
grated unitized. On the other hand, neutral information – which
is not privy to such prioritization – may require more cognitive
effort to successfully unitize.
Several investigations have demonstrated that when non-
emotional information is encoded as a feature of an emo-
tional item, memory for the relationship between the emotional
and non-emotional information is enhanced. For example, two
recent studies (Mather and Nesmith, 2008; Nashiro and Mather,
2010) demonstrated that when participants passively viewed non-
emotional and emotionally arousing pictures at different locations
on a computer screen, their memory for the location of emotion-
ally arousing pictures was significantly better than their memory
for the location of non-emotional pictures. Mather and Nesmith
(2008), in particular, offer evidence for the above points about
emotional information being integrated with relatively little cogni-
tive effort: In Experiment 4 of that investigation, the authors varied
the amount of time participants had to view pictures (relative
to the amount of study time provided in the first three experi-
ments) to determine if location memory tracked with the amount
of time participants had to view pictures. The authors found that
memory for the location of pictures was independent of how long
the pictures were presented. Moreover, it was shown that picture-
location conjunction memory for non-emotional pictures was not
impaired when those pictures were presented at the same time as
emotional pictures, even when encoding time was limited. From
this evidence, the authors conclude that arousing pictures did not
capture attention for any extended period of time (or else picture-
location memory for concurrent non-emotional pictures would be
impaired), suggesting that picture-location binding for arousing
pictures must happen quickly and with relatively little effort.
Another recent behavioral study (Guillet and Arndt, 2009)
demonstrated that inter-item memory could be enhanced by
arousal, as well. Mnemonic binding of verbal pairs was enhanced
if one of the target words was arousing (i.e., a “taboo” word).
Memory for the association between the taboo word and a neutral
word was enhanced relative to when the neutral word was paired
with another neutral word, or paired with a negative non-arousing
word. Though these data offer evidence that arousal may enhance
the formation of inter-item associations, it is important to note
that relatively little is known about what makes taboo words – and
their associations – memorable. Madan et al. (2012), for example,
demonstrated that arousal is only one dimension that separates
taboo words from other emotional high-arousal and emotional
low-arousal words. Those authors used multidimensional scal-
ing for several dimensions of normed ratings (e.g., “familiarity,”
“offensiveness,” “imageability”) of neutral, emotional, and taboo
words to show that arousal alone does not clearly differentiate
taboo words from other emotional words; rather, some undeter-
mined combination of other stimulus characteristics is likely to
better differentiate those stimuli. Therefore, it is unclear whether
it is the arousing nature of taboo words that leads them to be bet-
ter associated in Guillet and Arndt (2009), or if some other set of
characteristics – like offensiveness or “tabooness” that may be sep-
arate from arousal – is driving those effects. Moreover, Madan et al.
(2012) demonstrate that across a number of pair types – with pairs
containing only taboo, only moderately arousing negative, only
neutral, or any combination thereof – the presence of emotional
arousal only ever improved item memory, and never improved
association memory.
WHY AROUSAL MAY IMPAIR UNITIZATION
The prior discussion of goal relevance highlights an important
caveat regarding the beneficial effect of arousal on unitization:
Participants would need to find all of the to-be-unitized compo-
nents to be goal relevant in order for arousal to facilitate their
unitization. This goal relevance would likely be achieved in a task
that directed participants to integrate the various features, as the
task instructions would make both items relevant. But if integra-
tion is not emphasized, arousal may instead impair the unitization
by focusing perceptual and cognitive resources only on the arous-
ing feature, thereby preventing unitization with the other features.
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If attention is directed to the arousing information and not dis-
tributed to all elements of the to-be-unitized set, the unitization
may fail.
Arousing information can capture visual attention and can be
processed in a prioritized fashion. Studies that record partici-
pants’ eye gaze patterns while they view either arrays of emotional
and non-emotional stimuli or complex visual scenes have shown
that participants initially saccade to emotional information more
quickly, and they saccade more frequently to the emotional infor-
mation than to neutral information (LaBar et al., 2000; Öhman
and Mineka, 2001; Öhman et al., 2001; Mather and Knight, 2006;
Knight et al., 2007). In studies that require participants to detect
two or more target items in a rapidly presented stream of stim-
ulus items, a phenomenon known as the “attentional blink” is
typically observed: participants readily detect the first target item
in the rapid stream, but often miss the subsequent target item
(e.g., Chun and Potter, 1995). The presumption is that attentional
resources are directed toward detecting the first target item, result-
ing in the second item being missed. However, when the second
target item is emotionally arousing, the attentional blink effect
is attenuated. Despite presumably depleted attentional resources,
participants can still detect the emotional second target item
(Anderson and Phelps, 2001; Keil and Ihssen, 2004; Anderson,
2005). These findings suggest that when attentional resources are
limited, emotionally arousing items are preferentially processed
over neutral items.
This prioritized processing of the arousing information can
result in poor processing of temporally- or spatially-proximate
information (e.g., Easterbrook, 1959). These factors can combine
to create instances in which the arousing elements of an event (e.g.,
a smashed car) are remembered at the expense of the surround-
ing, non-emotional details (e.g., details of the street on which the
accident occurred; see reviews by Buchanan and Adolphs, 2002;
Reisberg and Heuer, 2004; Levine and Edelstein, 2009). Indeed,
in laboratory studies using complex visual scenes as encoding
stimuli, a “trade-off” in memory is often observed: participants
exhibit better memory for emotional than non-emotional items
that appeared in the scenes, and their memory for the background
details is better when those backgrounds are presented with neutral
rather than emotional items (e.g., Kensinger et al., 2005). Neurally
this trade-off is associated with increased activity in the mid-
dle temporal gyrus, among other regions (Waring and Kensinger,
2011). This region within the ventral visual stream is more active
during the encoding of scenes for which the emotional item is
subsequently remembered and the background forgotten than for
scenes in which both the item and background are remembered,
suggesting that visual resources may be preferentially processing
the emotional information at the expense of the non-emotional
information.
These findings may relate to the process of unitization for an
emotional and a non-emotional feature. If sensory-processing
regions preferentially process the emotional features over the
non-emotional feature, the success of the unitization could be
compromised. By giving preference to the emotional information,
the unitization may not equitably represent both the emotional
and non-emotional components. Instead, the unitization may be
dominated by the emotional information, or the unitization may
fail altogether because processing resources are focused on the
emotional information to the exclusion of the non-emotional
details.
Further evidence that emotion may impair the formation of
unitizations – particularly in the case of negative emotional infor-
mation – comes from a study by Okada et al. (2011). In that study,
participants were asked to learn novel pairs consisting of neu-
tral faces paired with positive, negative, or neutral words while
undergoing an fMRI scan. The researchers found a strong negative
correlation between left amygdala activity during the encoding of
negative pairs and subsequent memory performance, suggesting
that amygdala activation at encoding may disrupt the formation
of negative associations. It is important to note, though, that the
opposite effect was observed for positive face-name pairs: increases
in amygdala activation were related to better subsequent memory
for those pairs, suggesting that the effect of arousal may depend
on the valence of the information to be remembered.
THE MNEMONIC INFLUENCES OF AROUSAL: IMPLICATIONS FOR
UNITIZATION
One of the most-often replicated effects of arousal on memory is
the creation of a subjectively vivid memory (Phelps and Sharot,
2008; Sharot and Yonelinas, 2008; Zimmerman and Kelley, 2010).
The beneficial effects of arousal on memory are often detected on
tasks that assess not only recognition rates but also the subjec-
tive qualities of a memory. For instance, even when recognition
rates do not differ between arousing and neutral stimuli, partic-
ipants are often still more likely to say that they vividly recollect
emotional items (Ochsner, 2000; Talarico and Rubin, 2003; Sharot
et al., 2004). Although this effect may sometimes reflect a biased
endorsement of emotional memories (Windmann et al., 2002;
Dougal and Rotello, 2007), sometimes it seems to correspond with
an improved ability to remember at least some features of an arous-
ing item’s presentation (Neisser and Harsch, 1992; Kensinger and
Corkin, 2003; see review by Mather, 2007). By contrast, arousal
often does not enhance the familiarity of items, and when it does, it
often seems to do so for both studied and non-studied items alike,
increasing both correct and incorrect endorsements and having
little effect on memory discriminability (e.g., Sharot et al., 2004).
Consider that one of the predominant reasons why there is a
mnemonic benefit for unitizations may be because of their ability
to be recognized on the basis of familiarity (Diana et al., 2008, 2011;
but see Mickes et al., 2010). If so, then the literature just reviewed
may suggest that the relative benefit of unitization would be less
for emotional associations than for neutral associations. That is,
arousal may enhance processes that are connected to the recollec-
tion of information more than those connected to the familiarity
of information, while unitizations may do the opposite.
At a neural level, it is less clear whether there is a distinc-
tion between the memory regions most influenced by arousal
and those implicated in unitization. Certainly, much emphasis has
been placed on the ability for arousal to modulate hippocampal
function, via connections between the amygdala and the hip-
pocampus. The initial studies examining the effect of arousal on
memory consolidation focused on interactions between the amyg-
dala and hippocampus proper (reviewed by McGaugh, 2004) and
subsequent neuroimaging studies in humans have followed suit
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(reviewed by Phelps, 2004), often focusing on the correlations or
co-activations between the amygdala and the hippocampus during
the formation or retrieval of an emotional memory (e.g., Dolcos
et al., 2004; Kensinger and Corkin, 2004). Yet the amygdala also
shares strong reciprocal connections with the PrC (Pitkänen et al.,
2000; Kajiwara et al., 2003). A recent study revealed that stimula-
tion of the amygdala could lead to induction of synaptic plasticity
(i.e., long-term potentiation) within the PrC (Perugini et al., 2012),
demonstrating a functional connection between the two regions.
Thus, the finding that unitizations rely less on the hippocampus
and more on the PrC makes no strong prediction with regard to
the effect of emotion on unitization. The reciprocal connections
between the amygdala and the PrC appear to be sufficiently strong
to enable arousal-driven modulation, though of course it remains
an open question whether such modulation would occur during
the encoding or retrieval of unitizations.
As noted earlier, if unitizations rely on processes within the
ventral visual processing stream, the amygdala activation that
occurs during the experience of arousal would be likely to modu-
late processing within that stream (Anderson, 2005; Vuilleumier,
2005). There is ample evidence that the amygdala sends strong
back-projections to regions through the sensory cortices (Amaral
and Price, 1984; Iwai and Yukie, 1987; Morris et al., 1998), and
this prioritized processing may facilitate the creation of a uni-
tization. Thus, arousal could enhance the process of unitization
either through modulation of medial temporal-lobe processes or
through modulation of earlier sensory processes.
THE EFFECTS OF AROUSAL ON UNITIZATION: PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
We Murray and Kensinger (2012) conducted a study to examine
the effect of arousal on associative binding when unitization is
encouraged. We asked participants to study pairs of words and
to either maintain separate mental images of the items (non-
integrated) or to create an integrated, interactive mental image
of the two items (integrated), a task similar to that described in
Pilgrim et al. (2012). Some pairs contained an emotional and a
neutral word, and other pairs contained two neutral words. Each
study pair was displayed for 2, 4, or 6 s, and after each pair par-
ticipants were asked to report the vividness of the two individual
images (non-integrated) or one unified image (integrated) they
were able to generate.
Participants consistently rated their imagery success as being
high for emotional pairs, regardless of the length of the encod-
ing trial, but they reported little success in generating images for
neutral pairs during short (2-s) encoding trials. These results are
consistent with the prediction that arousal would facilitate the
process of unitization: When arousal was present, participants
were able to create an image that integrated two distinct items,
even with little time to do so.
Participants were then given a surprise cued recall test in which
they were given a single studied word and asked to provide its
paired counterpart. Because this was an associative task, we unsur-
prisingly found that pairs studied in the integration condition
were better recalled than those studied in the non-integration
condition. Conversely, on an item recognition test, performance
was better in the non-integrated condition than in the integrated
one. This finding is generally consistent with evidence presented
earlier, suggesting that although the formation of unitizations
can enhance memory for associations, this unitization some-
times comes at the cost of gaining access to the individual item
representations (Pilgrim et al., 2012).
The twist, however, was that the integration benefit was dispro-
portionately greater for neutral pairs than for pairs containing an
emotion word. Although participants had an easier time gener-
ating the integrated images for the emotional pairs, they showed
less of a mnemonic benefit from integration of those pairs. At
the broadest level, these data suggest that forming unitizations –
actually assembling together the different perceptual and semantic
features – and remembering those unitizations in long-term mem-
ory could be differentially affected by arousal. It is interesting
to note that this distinction parallels one noted by Zimmerman
and Kelley (2010); they reported that participants gave higher
judgments-of-learning to emotional pairs than to neutral ones but
actually remembered the emotional pairs less well. When review-
ing this study, Madan et al. (2012) suggested that the participants
may have applied less effort when forming associations of those
emotional items, an explanation that is also consistent with our
data. It may be the case that if information is more easily uni-
tized – perhaps via processes implemented in visual processing
regions – the mnemonic storage of that unitization is less effortful
and therefore less durable.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The research we have reviewed suggests the importance of dis-
tinguishing the effects of arousal on the initial process of forming
unitizations from the process of storing those unitizations over the
long term. Future research would do well to examine whether – if
these processes were distinguished, perhaps using methods simi-
lar to Staresina and Davachi (2010) – arousal would have different
effects on these two general types of processes.
It is also possible that the presence of arousal may lead to a
shift from conceptual to perceptual binding processes in creating
unitizations (see Graf and Schacter, 1989 for discussion of the
contribution of these different processes). In discussing the neural
architecture that may underlie encoding of emotional and non-
emotional unitization, we have offered that emotional unitizations
may be supported by interactions between the amygdala, ventral
visual stream, and PrC, suggesting that such unitizations may rely
on more perceptual linkages (e.g., what a poisonous plant looks
like). Non-emotional unitizations, by contrast, may more often
be supported by conceptual processes, perhaps requiring stimulus
elaboration to effectively concatenate (e.g., realizing that the blan-
ket, watermelon, and basket go together as a picnic). Although
further empirical testing of this hypothesis is required, a first set
of neuroimaging data (Murray and Kensinger, 2013) is consistent
with this hypothesis, with successful integration of emotional pairs
resulting in disproportionate activation within visual regions and
successful integration of neutral pairs resulting in greater activa-
tion within prefrontal regions. Moreover, amygdala activity during
negative integration was negatively correlated with activity in pre-
frontal and MTL regions, suggesting that amygdala engagement
may disrupt prefrontal and MTL processes, consistent with the
finding of Okada et al. (2011).
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Emotional arousal, then, may shift unitization processes away
from more conceptual ones implemented by prefrontal engage-
ment and toward more perceptual ones implemented within visual
regions. These different types of processes (perceptual vs. con-
ceptual) may have differential downstream effects on subsequent
memory for the unitizations. Conceptual elaboration may be a
slower, more laborious process, but it may lead to a more deeply
encoded, and more durable, representation. By contrast, percep-
tual integrations may happen rapidly, but be less durable over
time. In other words, there may be a levels-of-processing effect
(Craik and Lockhart, 1972), leading to a stronger and more durable
memory trace for unitizations formed using prefrontal and MTL
processes than for unitizations formed with disproportionate use
of visual processes.
It would be informative for future research to examine how
arousal affects the durability of unitizations. On the one hand, if
the main effect of arousal relates to the way in which unitizations
are initially formed, and if the processes creating unitizations for
arousing items are less effortful and less “deep,” then it might be
expected that the decay rate for emotional unitizations would be
faster than for neutral unitizations. On the other hand, however,
the consolidation hypothesis (Müller and Pilzecker, 1900), sug-
gests that after information is initially encoded it remains in a
fragile state before being solidified into memory (see review by
McGaugh, 2000). The consolidation process is relatively slow, and
one proposed reason is to give any associated emotional response
sufficient time to influence the consolidation process (McGaugh,
2000; Phelps, 2004). Indeed, there is robust evidence that arousal
often enhances the consolidation of information, such that the
beneficial effects of arousal are more likely to be apparent after
longer delays than after shorter ones. This pattern of results has
been shown not only in assessments of item memory (Sharot and
Phelps, 2004) but also in tests of associative memory (Pierce and
Kensinger, 2011; however, see Szpunar et al., 2012 for evidence that
memory for details of imagined future autobiographical events is
better for positive and negative than neutral events after a 10-min
delay, but better for positive and neutral than negative events after
a 24-h delay). Thus, it is possible that even if emotional unitiza-
tions are less “deep” and are maintained less well over relatively
short delays (e.g., 30 min), they may have a shallower forgetting
curve than neutral unitizations, making them more durable over
longer delays. Adjudicating between these alternatives – by assess-
ing memory for unitizations after multiple delays, or by disrupting
consolidation through a retroactive interference task – would
appear to be important for determining whether arousal primarily
exerts its effects on unitization through processes that occur as the
unitization is initially formed or whether the effects continue as
that unitization is stored.
As we have noted earlier, the neural processes that underlie
the formation and retrieval of unitizations are likely to depend
in some way on the verbal or visual demands of the unitization.
Although verbal unitizations (e.g., novel compound words; Gio-
vanello et al., 2006; Quamme et al., 2007; Haskins et al., 2008) and
visual unitizations (e.g., assembling a fragmented item and imag-
ining it in a specified color; Staresina and Davachi, 2010) share
some similarity – that is, they can be performed without reliance
on hippocampal processing – no study has directly contrasted
the neural correlates supporting their creation or retrieval. Emo-
tion may also affect the unitization process differently, depending
on the modality of processing. The amygdala can influence both
visual processing (Vuilleumier et al., 2001, 2004; Compton, 2003;
Mather et al., 2006) and semantic processing (Skipper et al., 2011),
but the extent to which those influences differ for visual and verbal
unitization – or on tasks that require some combination thereof
(e.g., Staresina and Davachi, 2006, 2008; Murray and Kensinger,
2012) – is currently unknown. Therefore, we believe a fruitful
future investigation would employ both verbal and visual unitiza-
tion of emotional and non-emotional information, in an attempt
to elucidate the similarities and differences between those two
domains.
One area that we have not discussed to this point is how unitiza-
tion processes may be utilized in the creation of autobiographical
memories. Current theories of autobiographical retrieval suggest
that it is a reconstructive process (see reviews by Conway, 1996;
Holland and Kensinger, 2010) in which memories of our past
are reconstructed at retrieval from our stores of autobiographi-
cal knowledge. This reconstructive nature imparts flexibility on
retrieval from events in our past: the same event may be described
differently at different time points. Autobiographical details also
can be intentionally recombined into past events that did not
occur, or into simulated, plausible future events. In one fMRI
study, Addis et al. (2009) asked participants to report details of
autobiographical events (i.e., the “who,”“what,” and “where”) dur-
ing a pre-scan session, and then directed those participants to
imagine novel past and future events that consisted of recom-
bined details from participants’ actual memories. For example, if
the participant reported memories of “Jess buying a lottery ticket
at a convenience store,” “Eating chicken fajitas with Cathy at Bor-
der’s Café,” and “Buying a flat screen TV with John at Best Buy”
the participant may be asked to imagine a novel past or future
event that involved “John,” “Border’s Café,” and “lottery ticket.”
One could conceive of this process as being similar to unitiza-
tion in that participants must take previously unrelated details
and combine them into a single representation. A key difference
however, is that in these tasks participants are asked to generate a
representation of a new event, localized in time and space. To our
knowledge, no tasks of unitization require this type of temporal or
spatial localization of the representation. Perhaps because of this
key difference, in the studies by Addis et al. (2009), this imaginative
generation was shown to recruit activity in bilateral hippocam-
pus, as well as activity in anterior prefrontal cortex and angular
gyrus. These results suggest that whereas unitization of two words
or items into a new representation may be accomplished in the
absence of hippocampal processing (e.g., Giovanello et al., 2006;
Staresina and Davachi, 2010), when new representations are cre-
ated as events anchored in time and space, this may require the
hippocampus.
CONCLUSIONS
The literature reviewed here suggests that unitized associations
can be formed and retrieved using dissociable processes from
those used to support memory for other associative memories.
Unitized associations can be remembered on the basis of familiar-
ity and in the absence of hippocampal function. Their formation
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appears to be supported by some combination of processing within
sensory-processing regions and within the rhinal cortex, although
additional research is needed to further specify the involvement of
these regions.
At least within a laboratory setting, when unitization is the
specified goal, arousal appears to enhance the ability to form an
integrated representation; this representation can be formed with
high success even when under time pressure. Yet arousal does not
enhance the ability to remember that unitized representation over
the long-term,revealing a distinction between facilitated formation
of a unitization and facilitated retention of that unitization. Fur-
ther research will be needed to elucidate the reasons for these
distinctions, but we suggest that arousal may facilitate the forma-
tion of unitizations via perceptual processing, whereas unitization
for neutral items may be more likely to recruit conceptual processes
implemented within prefrontal and MTL regions.
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